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Abstract
We consider a service system (QS) that operates according to the FCFS discipline,
and in which the service rate is an increasing function of the queue length. Customers
arrive sequentially to the system and decide whether or not to join, using decision rules
based upon the queue length on arrival to QS . Each customer is interested in selecting
a rule that meets a certain optimality criterion with regards to their expected sojourn
time in the system; as a consequence, the decision rules of other customers need to be
taken into account. Within a particular class of decision rules for an associated infinite
player game, the structure of the Nash equilibrium routing policies is characterized. We
prove that within this class, there exist a finite number of Nash equilibria, and that at
least one of these is non-randomized. Finally, we explore the extent to which the Nash
equilibria are characteristic of customer joining behaviour under a learning rule based on
system-wide data with the aid of simulation experiments.
KEYWORDS: QUEUES, STATE DEPENDENT SERVICE RATE; NON-COOPERATIVE GAME; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; SIM-
ULATION
1 Introduction
This paper looks at customer joining behaviour into a first come first served single server
queueing system where the service rate responds to changes in the queue size.
Customers are prepared to join the system only if their expected time there is projected to
be not too high. However, due to the nature of the service rate function, the routing decisions
of customers that arrive on the scene in the future could affect the sojourn times of customers
that are already present in the system.
In order to make an assessment as to whether or not quality of service requirements will be
met upon joining such a system, assumptions regarding the form of the routing decisions (as to
whether to join or balk) taken by other customers will have to be made. The routing decision
∗Postal address: School of Economics, Mathematics, & Statistics, Birkbeck College, Malet Street, London
WC1E 7HX, U.K.
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to be taken by each customer is whether or not to join the system on the basis of quantities
which may depend on the number of customers observed on arrival to the system.
This leads us to analyze the problem as an infinite-player non-cooperative (stationary)
game, where the expected sojourn times at particular entry states are considered. Here, the
aim is to characterize the conditions under which Nash equilibrium routing policies exist, and
to explore the structure of such policies.
We also examine a scenario in which customers base their joining decisions on sample mean
sojourn times of customers that have previously passed through the system, again, at partic-
ular entry states. Thus, routing decisions are subject to dynamic learning. Using simulation
methods, we explore the extent to which the long-term (non-transient) behaviour of the system
under the learning rule adheres to that under the Nash equilibria.
The seminal and most relevant work on the game-theoretic analysis of this class of queueing
system was carried out by Altman and Shimkin [2], in which a processor sharing system was
investigated. They established the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium
joining policy for the stationary game; it was also demonstrated via simulation methods (and,
in [1], using the theory of the Stochastic Approximations(SA) algorithm) that it can be used to
characterize the convergent behaviour of the system (in an almost sure sense) when customers
base their joining decisions on a certain class of dynamic learning rule.1. Buche and Kushner
[6, 7] analyzed a modified learning rule for the processor sharing system in which a discount
factor was incorporated: this allowed the most recent system data to be weighted more heavily
than that from the distant past. Again, using theory related to Stochastic Approximations,
they show that their learning rule converges to that of the symmetric Nash equilibrium in a
weak sense.
The general theory developed in [2] was applied to a multiple server retrial system in Brooms
[4], and to a FIFO system where the service rate is non-increasing in the system load in Brooms
[5]. The analysis of the processor sharing system was extended in Ben-Shahar et. al. [3] to
the case where customers arrive to the system with differing quality of service requirements
(although with the same exponential service distributions). Existence of a Nash equilibrium
for this class-heterogeneous scenario was established; uniqueness was also asserted albeit under
the proviso that the inter-arrival times were also i.i.d. exponential (in order to facilitate a
coupling argument).
The notion of individual optimality pertains neither to the processor sharing system of
[2], nor to the one considered in this paper, unless the routing decisions of future arrivals are
taken into account; this is because the sojourn time of a customer who enters such a system
will depend on the joining rules adopted by future arriving customers. Systems in which
characterization of an individually optimal policy is possible, without having to condition on
the decision rules of others, have been considered by Naor [10], and Yechiali [11], for example.
Lippman and Stidham [8] also considered an exponential service system, consisting of a FCFS
queue with a concave increasing, and bounded, service rate. However, they make the key
assumption that a ’...customer’s holding time is not affected by future arrivals’: thus individual
optimality can be characterized there.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we specify the model in
1We consider this learning rule for our system later in this paper.
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detail, which includes a more thorough description of the decision rules used by the arriving
customers. In Section 3 the generic random variables, and various processes defined with
respect to these, will be introduced. In Section 4, we use coupling arguments to establish
stochastic order results for the sojourn time in QS with respect to the entry state. This is
followed up, in Section 5, by a discussion on monotonicity and continuity of the sojourn time
with respect to symmetric threshold policies. The properties established in these latter two
sections are then brought together in Section 6 to characterize the existence, and structure, of
symmetric Nash equilibrium joining policies for the stationary game. An algorithm for finding
the symmetric Nash equilibrium policies is outlined in Section 7. A simulation of the system
under a similar learning rule to the one proposed in [2] is presented in Section 8. Plots of
the empirical average sojourn times and of the entrance probabilities, against time, for various
arrival states are presented, and we argue that these show a close correspondence with the
behaviour under the stationary game when the Nash equilibrium is unique. We conclude our
discussion in Section 9.
2 The Model
We take Z+ = {1, 2, . . .}, N = Z+ ∪ {0}, and R+ = {x∈R : x > 0} throughout the paper.
An arriving customer has to choose between either joining a shared service system, which is a
FCFS queue (denoted by QS), or balking.
It is assumed that QS has a buffer size B, which may be finite or infinite. Any customer
which arrives when the buffer is full is not permitted to enter the system.
The departure process in QS at queue length x forms a Poisson process at rate µ(x), where
µ(x) is a strictly increasing and bounded function on x ∈ {1, 2 . . . , B}, with µ(0) = 0. Set
µ = sup{µ(x) : x=1, 2, . . .}.
Let θ be the quality of service requirement. If an arriving customer perceives that the
(expected/empirical) sojourn time in QS is greater than this value, then it will be reluctant to
enter the system.
It is assumed that µ(1)−1 < θ. This condition ensures that it is always worthwhile for a
customer to enter QS if the system is empty upon arrival.
Let the number of customers inQS at time t be denoted byX(t) with initial stateX(0) = x0.
Let Ak be the arrival time of the k-th customer to the system, where 0=A0<A1<A2< . . .;
denote this k-th customer by the label Ck, k∈N, where it is assumed that C0 arrives at time
A0 (i.e. at time 0). Call the sequence of customers C0, C1, . . . , Ck, . . . the (overall) arrival
stream.
The decision as to whether Ck enters QS or not, is taken on the basis of X(Ak), the queue
length in QS just prior to its arrival.
A customer within the arrival stream can either be controlled, or uncontrolled, with proba-
bilities 1− p, and p, respectively, independently of all other customers, and irrespective of the
state of the system upon arrival. If the customer that arrives at time Ak, say, is uncontrolled,
then it will enter QS if and only if X(Ak) < B;
Label the r-th controlled customer who could potentially arrive at (albeit not necessarily
enter) the system by C(r), r∈Z+.
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Further define T (r) to be the ’arrival index’ corresponding to the r-th controlled customer;
the r-th controlled customer receives the label CT (r), and arrives at time AT (r), within the
overall arrival stream. The precise construction of the function T (·) : Z+ 7−→ N will be given
in Section 3.
A decision rule, u(·) :{0, 1, . . . , B−1} 7−→ [0, 1], is defined to be a function that specifies the
probability that a customer adhering to it enters QS, which is equal to u(x) if the number of
customers in QS is equal to x just prior to its arrival. Let U denote the set of all such decision
rules. Define uk(·) to be the decision rule associated with customer Ck, k ∈ N, and u(r)(·),
r ∈ Z+, to be the decision rule associated with the r-th controlled customer C(r). A policy,
pi = (u(1), u(2), . . . , u(r), . . .) ∈ U∞, is a collection of decision rules, whose r-th member, u(r)(·),
r∈Z+, represents the decision rule associated with C(r).
Let vk(x, pi), x∈{0, 1, . . . , B−1}, be the sojourn time of Ck in QS, given that x customers
were present in QS just prior to its arrival, and that any controlled customer arriving in the
future adheres to its decision rule inferred by pi. Further define Vk(x, pi) to be the expected
value of vk(x, pi).
Define k′=max{r∈N : T (r) ≤ k}. We draw attention to the slight abuse of terminology
insofar that pi need only represent the collection (u(k
′+1), u(k
′+2), . . .): for given x, and by
the assumption that Ck joins QS, (u
(0), u(1), . . . , u(k
′−1), u(k
′)) do not provide any additional
information about vk(x, pi).
Also, let v(k)(x, pi), x∈{0, 1, . . . , B−1}, be the sojourn time of the k-th controlled customer to
enter QS, given that x customers were present in QS just prior to its arrival, and any controlled
customer arriving in the future adheres to its decision rule inferred by pi. Further define
V (k)(x, pi) to be the expected value of v(k)(x, pi). Here, pi need only represent (u(k+1), u(k+2), . . .).
There is no collaboration between customers, and each controlled customer seeks to choose
an optimal joining rule with regard to some measure of their projected sojourn time in QS and
the quality of service requirement. Bearing these points in mind, we are lead to analyze this
system within the paradigm of the infinite player non-cooperative game.
A decision rule uk(·) for the k-th customer in the overall arrival stream is said to be optimal
against the policy pi if
uk(x) =

1 if Vk(x, pi) < θ
0 if Vk(x, pi) > θ
q ∈ [0, 1] if Vk(x, pi) = θ
(1)
for x∈{0, 1, . . . , B−1}.
The collection of all possible decision rules of Ck which are optimal against pi is denoted by
Uk(pi).
A policy pi = (u(1), u(2), . . .) is said to be a Nash equilibrium policy if, for every r∈Z+, the
decision rule of the r-th controlled customer, u(r)(·), is optimal against pi.
Under this regime, there is no guarantee that uncontrolled customers will ever be exhibiting
optimal behaviour.
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3 Random Variables and Processes
Let {Mi : i ∈ Z+}, {Nj : j ∈ Z+}, {Uk : k ∈ Z+}, {Uφk : k ∈ N}, and {U
′
l : l ∈ Z+}, be
mutually independent sequences of random variables, where:
• {Mi : i∈Z+} is a sequence of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random vari-
ables with mean 0 < λ−1 <∞;
• {Ak : k∈N} is the sequence of arrival times to the system, where A0 := 0, and Ak :=
∑k
i=1Mi,
k ∈ Z+;
• {Uk : k∈N} is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables which are uniformly distributed on the
interval (0, 1]. The random variable Uk will be used to decide whether or not customer Ck
enters QS;
• {Uφk : k∈N} is a sequence of i.i.d. uniform random variables on (0, 1] used for determining
whether an arrival to the system is controlled, or uncontrolled;
• {Nj : j∈Z+} is a sequence of i.i.d. exponential random variables, with mean µ−1<∞;
• {Sl : l∈Z+} is the sequence of potential service completion times for customers in QS, where
Sl :=
∑l
j=1Nj;
• {U ′l : l ∈ Z+} is a sequence of i.i.d. uniform random variables on (0, 1] used for determining
whether a potential departure time corresponds to an actual departure, or a dummy event.
Further define {tn : n∈Z+} to be the order statistics for the set {Ak} ∪ {Sl}, where ti < tj for
i < j.
The specifications of the arrival decisions, and departures from QS, are presented at the end of
the section. These will provide further motivation for the formal definitions of the stochastic
processes which are given next.
Queue length process:
For a given initial state X(0) = x0, and policy pi, let {X(t) : t ≥ 0} be the queue length
process, where X(t) represents the number of customers in the system at time t.
This process is defined to be left-continuous, piecewise constant, with its potential jumps de-
scribed by the following relations:
X(A+k ) = X(Ak) + 1{Uk < uk(X(Ak))} k ∈ N
X(S+l ) = xl − 1{U
′
l < µ(X(Sl))/µ} l ∈ Z+
(2)
where 1{·} is the indicator function .
Note that if the {Ul} were chosen to be uniform on the interval [0, 1] rather than (0, 1], then
we would need to additionally include X(Sl)>0 inside the indicator function in the second of
the two relations.
The ’remaining service transitions’ (RST)-process
Let {Z(t) : t ≥ 0} be the RST-process. This process is defined to be left continuous, piecewise-
constant, and non-increasing, where:
Z(0) = X(0) = x0, and with its potential jumps (coinciding with times of departure) satisfying
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the following relation:
Z(S+l ) = Z(Sl)− 1{Z(Sl) > 0, U
′
l < µ(X(Sl))/µ} l ∈ Z+
. (3)
When C0 is in the queue, then Z(t) represents the number of customers present less those that
are residing behind C0 (or the number of actual service transitions that still need to occur
before C0 exits) at time t, and Z(t) = 0 if customer C0 is not present at time t;
Service Time
It is clear that if C0 actually enters QS, then its sojourn time would be equal to
v0 = min{t :Z(t) = 0}.
Arrivals to QS:
At time Ak, customer Ck arrives at QS and enters the system with probability γ, say, which
depends on its decision rule and the value of X(Ak). The actual decision is based on the value
of the random variable Uk and γ in the following way:
Ck enters QS if and only if Uk ≤ γ.
The mapping T (·) : Z+ 7→ N is defined more precisely as follows:
T (r) = min{n ∈ N :
n∑
l=0
1
{
Uφl > p
}
= r}
for r ∈ Z+.
On each realization of the {Uφl }, the set of indices corresponding to controlled customers in the
overall arrival stream is
I = {m ∈N : ∃ r ∈ Z+ s.t. m = T (r)}.
Thus, for k ∈ I, uk(x) = u(T−1(k))(x), and for k /∈ I, uk(x) ≡ 1 for x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B − 1}.
Service at QS:
For ease of exposition, define xl to be equal to X(Sl), the queue length in QS just prior to a
potential departure at time Sl.
If U
′
l ∈ (µ(xl)/µ, 1], then Sl is considered to be a dummy service completion instant; otherwise
any customer at the server completes service and departs from the system.
The above procedure invokes a uniformization technique (see [9]). The fact that such a
procedure generates actual departure times with the correct distribution can be seen as follows.
As long as the queue length remains at x ∈ Z+, the next potential departure is generated from
a Poisson process with rate µ(x). Now consider a Poisson process in which events occur at the
uniform rate of µ, the fastest rate at which departures could possibly occur. Whenever the
queue length is x, and an event from the Poisson process with rate µ occurs, then it corresponds
to an actual departure with probability µ(x)/µ, independently of all other events. But since
this corresponds to a Bernoulli sampling of a Poisson process, then departures at queue length
x are Poisson with rate µ× µ(x)/µ = µ(x), as anticipated.
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4 Monotonicity with respect to Entry Queue Size
We show, in the sense of stochastic dominance, and in the sense of expectation, that v0(x, pi)
is an increasing function of x for any pi which is member of a certain class of policies: this class
is defined below.
Definition
Let T be the class of decision rules which are non-increasing functions of the queue length
x∈ {0, 1, . . . , B−1}. Also, let T∞ be the class of policies in which the decision rule for each
controlled customer is a member of T. We also note that the decision rule corresponding to an
uncontrolled customer trivially belongs to T: thus, with regard to the proofs in this section, no
special distinction needs to be made between controlled and uncontrolled customers.
Evaluating the distribution of v0(x, pi) appears to be less than straightforward for anything but
the simplest cases. This difficulty will be circumvented by utilizing stochastic coupling and
forward induction techniques. The collections of random variables and stochastic processes,
which we shall parenthetically refer to as ’systems’, upon which these stochastic comparisons
will be based, are introduced next.
’System’ X
This is characterized by the sets of random variables, decision rules, and stochastic processes
listed below.
(I): M = {Mi}, N = {Nj}, U = {Uk}, Uφ = {Uφk }, U ′ = {U ′l};
(II): the arrival time sequence A = {Ak}, and the potential departure time sequence S = {Sl};
(III): customer C0 enters QS at time A0 = 0, with all other controlled customers adhering to
policy pi ∈ T∞;
(IV): the queue length process {X(t) : t ≥ 0} with X(0) = x;
(V): the RST-process {Z(t) : t ≥ 0} with Z(0) = x;
(VI): v0, the sojourn time of C0 in QS.
’System’ X˜
This is characterized in a similar way to X , except that the quantities of (I˜I)-(V˜I) are defined
in terms of those of (˜I) in the obvious way.
(˜I): M˜ = {M˜i}, N˜ = {N˜j}, U˜ = {U˜k}, U˜φ = {U˜φk }, U˜ ′ = {U˜ ′l}, which have the same distribu-
tions as M, N , U , Uφ, and U ′, respectively;
(I˜I): the arrival time sequence A˜ = {A˜k}, and the potential departure time sequence S˜ = {S˜l};
(I˜II): as in (III) for X with A˜0=0;
(I˜V): the queue length process {X˜(t) : t ≥ 0} with X˜(0) = x+ 1;
(V˜): the RST-process {Z˜(t) : t ≥ 0} with Z˜(0) = x+ 1;
(V˜I): v˜0, the sojourn time of C0 in QS.
We intend to relate X with X˜ to each other using the following device:
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Coupling C
Set
Mi = M˜i i ∈ Z+
Nj = N˜j j ∈ Z+
Uk = U˜k k ∈ N
Uφk = U˜
φ
k k ∈ N
U
′
l = U˜
′
l l ∈ Z+
.
The effect of this procedure is that arrival instants {Ak}, potential departure times {Sl}, the
{Uk}, the positions of controlled customers in the overall arrival sequence, and the {U ′l }, under
X , take the same values as their counterparts under X˜ , on each realization.
The next result allows us to infer that under the above coupling, v0 ≤ v˜0.
Lemma 1 For systems (X , X˜ ) under coupling C, in which pi ∈ T∞, one of the following sets
of relations will hold at each time t ∈ R+:
X(t) + 1 = X˜(t)
Z(t) + 1 = Z˜(t)
(4)
X(t) = X˜(t)
Z(t) = Z˜(t)
(5)
X(t) = X˜(t)
Z(t) + 1 = Z˜(t).
(6)
Proof By definition of X and X˜ ,
Z(0+) = X(0+) = x+ 1 < x+ 2 = X˜(0+) = Z˜(0+). (7)
Assume that tn+1 corresponds to an arrival, with tn+1 = Ar, or a departure, with tn+1 = Sm,
such that C0 is still present in QS under X .
Before proceeding, we observe that if tn+1 does indeed correspond to an arrival time, then
due to the class of policies and the coupling being considered, one of the following three sce-
narios must arise:
(i) Cr enters QS under both X and X˜ ,
(ii) Cr enters QS under X only,
(iii) Cr balks under both X and X˜ .
Case 1: Suppose that (4) holds at time t+n .
tn+1 ∈ {Ak}
Under (i),
X(t+n+1) = X(t
+
n ) + 1 = X˜(t
+
n ) = X˜(t
+
n+1)− 1. (8)
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Under (ii),
X(t+n+1) = X(t
+
n ) + 1 = X˜(t
+
n ) = X˜(t
+
n+1). (9)
Under (iii), the states of the queue-length processes for X and X˜ at time t+n+1 are the same as
they were at time t+n .
Also, since Cr would reside behind C0 if it were to enter QS, then there would be no change in
the RST-processes in each of the above scenarios, i.e.
Z(t+n+1) = Z(t
+
n ) = Z˜(t
+
n )− 1 = Z˜(t+n+1)− 1. (10)
Thus, at time t+n+1, (4) holds under scenarios (i) and (iii), whereas (6) holds under scenario (ii).
tn+1 ∈ {Sl}
Since xm < x˜m, by assumption, then µ(xm) < µ(x˜m).
If U ′m ≤ µ(xm)/µ, then an actual departure occurs under both X and X˜ . Therefore
X(t+n+1) = X(t
+
n )− 1 = (X˜(t+n )− 1)− 1 = X˜(t+n+1)− 1 (11)
Z(t+n+1) = Z(t
+
n )− 1 = (Z˜(t+n )− 1)− 1 = Z˜(t+n+1)− 1. (12)
Thus (4) holds at time t+n+1.
If U ′m ∈ (µ(xm)/µ, µ(x˜m)/µ], then an actual departure occurs under X˜ but not under X .
Therefore,
X(t+n+1) = X(t
+
n ) = X˜(t
+
n )− 1 = X˜(t+n+1) (13)
Z(t+n+1) = Z(t
+
n ) = Z˜(t
+
n )− 1 = Z˜(t+n+1). (14)
Thus, (5) holds at time t+n+1.
If U ′m > µ(x˜m)/µ, then the states of the processes remain unchanged, i.e.
X(t+n+1) = X(t
+
n ) = X˜(t
+
n )− 1 = X˜(t+n+1)− 1 (15)
Z(t+n+1) = Z(t
+
n ) = Z˜(t
+
n )− 1 = Z˜(t+n+1)− 1 (16)
i.e. (4) holds at time t+n+1.
Case 2: Suppose that (5) holds at time t+n .
It follows that (5) holds at time t+n+1 also, as the following argument shows.
tn+1 ∈ {Ak}
Since the queue lengths are identical, as are the decision rules for Cr, under both X and X˜ ,
then the decision as to whether or not to enter QS will be the same under both systems. Hence
X(t+n+1) = X˜(t
+
n+1). (17)
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Again, since Cr would reside behind C0 should it actually enter QS, then the states of the
RST-processes remain unchanged.
tn+1 ∈ {Sl}
Since xm = x˜m, then µ(xm) = µ(x˜m).
If U ′m ≤ µ(xm)/µ, then there is an actual departure under both X and X˜ , and so
X(t+n+1) = X(t
+
n )− 1 = X˜(t+n )− 1 = X˜(t+n+1) (18)
Z(t+n+1) = Z(t
+
n )− 1 = Z˜(t+n )− 1 = Z˜(t+n+1). (19)
If U ′m > µ(xm)/µ then there are no actual departures under both X and X˜ , and so there is no
change in either the queue-length, or RST, processes, i.e.
X(t+n+1) = X(t
+
n ) = X˜(t
+
n ) = X˜(t
+
n+1) (20)
Z(t+n+1) = Z(t
+
n ) = Z˜(t
+
n ) = Z˜(t
+
n+1). (21)
Case 3: Suppose that (6) holds at time t+n .
It follows that (6) holds at time t+n+1 also, as the argument below shows.
tn+1 ∈ {Ak}
For the same reasons as in the previous case, the queue lengths remain equal, i.e.
X(t+n+1) = X˜(t
+
n+1), (22)
and there are no changes in the RST-processes.
tn+1 ∈ {Sl}
Since xm = x˜m, then µ(xm) = µ(x˜m). Again, for the same reasons as in the previous case, if
U ′m ≤ µ(xm)/µ then
X(t+n+1) = X(t
+
n )− 1 = X˜(t+n )− 1 = X˜(t+n+1) (23)
Z(t+n+1) = Z(t
+
n )− 1 = (Z˜(t+n )− 1)− 1 = Z˜(t+n+1)− 1. (24)
On the other hand, if U ′m > µ(xm)/µ then there is no change in either the queue-length, or the
RST, processes. 2
Recalling the definition for the sojourn time of C0 in QS, the following Lemma now holds.
Lemma 2 For all pi∈T∞ and k∈N, Vk(x, pi) is strictly increasing in x, in the sense that for
x∈{0, 1, . . . , B−2},
Vk(x+ 1, pi)− Vk(x, pi)≥δx>0
uniformly in pi.
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ProofWithout loss of generality, and for concreteness, consider customer C0. Consider systems
(X , X˜ ) under coupling C. From the definitions of v0 and v˜0, and by Lemma 1,
v0 ≤ v˜0
which implies that E[v0] ≤ E[v˜0]. To establish the sharp inequality, define the event Dx:
Dx = {Sx+1 < A1, U ′m ≤ µ(xm)/µ, m=1, . . . , x+1}.
This is the event that customer C1 arrives no earlier than the (x+ 1)-st departure under both
systems, where C0 leaves under X at time Sx+1, but becomes the only customer left in QS
under X˜ at that time. By conditioning on this event, noting that v0 < v˜0 on Dx and that
P(Dx) > 0, then the result follows. 2
5 Monotonicity and Continuity with respect to Thresh-
old Policies
This section examines the behaviour of the sojourn time in QS with respect to a certain type
of threshold rule, which is introduced below.
Definition
For L∈N and q∈ [0, 1], an [L, q]-threshold decision rule u(·) is defined as follows:
u(x) =

1 if x<L
q if x=L
0 if x>L
.
This may be represented more compactly by [L, q], or indeed [g], where g= L + q. Of course,
for B<∞, [B] is equivalent to [g] whenever g > B.
We are ultimately interested in the characterization of symmetric policies: these are poli-
cies in which each and every controlled customer adopts the same decision rule.
A policy pi in which the decision rule for each controlled customer is given by [g], is denoted
by [g]∞: we call this a symmetric threshold policy.
Next we introduce another two ’systems’ which will facilitate the proofs of the results for
this section.
’System’ G
(I),(II),(IV), (V) and (VI) are exactly as in X . However (III) becomes
(III): customer C0 enters QS at time A0 = 0, with all other controlled customers adhering to
policy [g]∞, where g ∈ [0, B).
11
’System’ G˜
(˜I), (I˜I), and (V˜I) are precisely the same as for X˜ ;
(I˜II): customer C0 enters QS at time A0=0, with all other controlled customers adhering to
the policy [g˜]∞, with g < g˜ ≤ B (where the latter inequality is strict if B=∞);
(I˜V): the queue length process {X˜(t) : t ≥ 0} with X˜(0) = x;
(V˜): the RST-process {Z˜(t) : t ≥ 0} with Z˜(0) = x.
It is implicit from the definition of g and g˜ that L<B.
From now on, g ∈ [0, B] will be taken to mean 0 ≤ g ≤ B when B is finite, and
0 ≤ g < B when B is non-finite, unless specified to the contrary.
The next two results will be used to infer results about Vk(·, [g]∞) on the intervals [0, 1] and
[1, B].
Lemma 3 For systems (G, G˜) under coupling C, the following set of relations hold at each time
t∈R+:
X(t) ≤ X˜(t) (25)
Z(t) ≥ Z˜(t). (26)
Proof Assume that tn+1 corresponds to an arrival time, where tn+1 = Ar, or a potential de-
parture time, where tn+1 = Sm, such that C0 is still present in QS under G˜.
First note that
Z(0+) = X(0+) = x+ 1 = X˜(0+) = Z˜(0+).
Now suppose that
X(t+n ) ≤ X˜(t+n ) (27)
Z(t+n ) ≥ Z˜(t+n ) . (28)
Case 1: Relation (27) is strict.
tn+1 ∈ {Ak}
If X˜(t+n ) < B then either Cr enters QS under neither, one, or both of G and G˜ (noting that the
last of these scenarios certainly occurs if Cr is uncontrolled); it follows that
X(t+n+1) ≤ X˜(t+n+1)
(which holds with equality when Cr enters QS under G only and X(t+n ) = X˜(t+n )− 1).
If X˜(t+n ) = B then Cr can only enter QS under G (and will certainly enter under G if Cr
is uncontrolled). Hence
X(t+n+1) ≤ X˜(t+n+1) = B. (29)
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Since Cr can never reside ahead of C0 in any of these scenarios, then there can be no change
in the RST-processes, so that
Z(t+n+1) = Z(t
+
n ) ≥ Z˜(t+n ) = Z˜(t+n+1). (30)
tn+1 ∈ {Sl}
Since xm < x˜m, then µ(xm) < µ(x˜m).
If U ′m ≤ µ(xm)/µ, then an actual departure occurs under both G and G˜, and so
X(t+n+1) = X(t
+
n )− 1 < X˜(t+n )− 1 = X˜(t+n+1) (31)
Z(t+n+1) = Z(t
+
n )− 1 ≥ Z˜(t+n )− 1 = Z˜(t+n+1). (32)
If U ′m ∈ (µ(xm)/µ, µ(x˜m)/µ], then an actual departure occurs under G˜, but not under G, and
so
X(t+n+1) = X(t
+
n ) ≤ X˜(t+n )− 1 = X˜(t+n+1) (33)
Z(t+n+1) = Z(t
+
n ) ≥ Z˜(t+n ) > Z˜(t+n )− 1 = Z˜(t+n+1). (34)
If U ′m > µ(xm)/µ then there is no change, i.e. (25) holds strictly, and (26) also holds, at time
t+n+1.
Case 2: Relation (27) holds with equality.
tn+1 ∈ {Ak}
Here, either Cr enters QS under none, or both, of G and G˜, or indeed just G˜ alone (and the
second of these scenarios will certainly hold if X(t+n ) = X˜(t
+
n ) < B and Cr is uncontrolled).
Therefore
X(t+n+1) ≤ X˜(t+n+1). (35)
As in the previous case, Cr is not able to reside ahead of C0, and so, again, (26) holds at time
t+n+1.
tn+1 ∈ {Sl}
Since xm = x˜m, then µ(xm) = µ(x˜m).
If U ′m ≤ µ(xm)/µ, then an actual departure occurs under both G and G˜, and so
X(t+n+1) = X(t
+
n )− 1 = X˜(t+n )− 1 = X˜(t+n+1) (36)
Z(t+n+1) = Z(t
+
n )− 1 ≥ Z˜(t+n )− 1 = Z˜(t+n+1). (37)
If U ′m > µ(xm)/µ, then there is no change, i.e. (25) holds with equality, and (26) holds at time
t+n+1. 2
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Lemma 4 For systems (G, G˜) under coupling C, with 0 < g < g˜ ≤ 1, the following set of
relations hold at each time t∈R+ throughout the sojourn of C0 (in either system):
X(t) = X˜(t) (38)
Z(t) = Z˜(t). (39)
Proof Since X(0) = x = X˜(0), arrivals into QS, actual departures, and dummy events will
coincide in the two systems during the sojourn of C0 at least until such time that a disparity
in the arrival decisions occurs. However, since 0 < g < g˜ ≤ 1, then the first opportunity for a
customer to enter QS under G˜, but not under G, are when the queues are completely empty:
but, C0 will obviously have left by this time. Therefore, as a result, the relations (38) and (39)
will hold also. 2
Next, we define the following quantity for the ensuing discussion.
q̂ := 1− (1− q˜)1{L = L˜}. (40)
Lemma 5 For each k∈N, and x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B−1}
(i) Vk(x, [g]
∞) is constant in g on [0, 1];
(ii) Vk(x, [g]
∞) is strictly decreasing in g on [1, B].
Proof Without loss of generality, and for concreteness, consider customer C0. Consider the
systems (G, G˜) under coupling C. From the definitions of v0 and v˜0, and by invoking Lemma
3, it is easy to see that
E[v0] ≥ E[v˜0] (41)
which holds with equality whenever 0 ≤ g < g˜ ≤ 1 by Lemma 4, thereby establishing (i). Thus
assume that 1 ≤ g < g˜ and define the following events.
For x < L,
Fα = {AL−x < S1;AL−x+1 > Sx+1;UφL−x > p;UL−x∈(q, q̂];
U ′1 ∈ (µ(X(S1))/µ, µ(X˜(S1))/µ];
U ′m ≤ µ(X(Sm))/µ : m=2, . . . , x+1}.
Any realization on Fα under coupling C results in the following occurrences, in the order pre-
sented below:
• L− x− 1 customers enter QS under both G and G˜, resulting in the queue size moving up to
L and C0 remaining at position x+ 1 in both cases;
• a controlled customer enters QS under G˜, but not under G: this results in the queue size
under G˜ moving from L to L+ 1, but remaining at L under G, with C0 still at position x+ 1
in both cases;
• a departure occurs under G˜, but not under G: this results in the queue size being equal to L
in both cases, C0 remaining at position x+1 under G, and C0 moving to position x (or indeed
exiting the system if x = 0) under G˜;
• a further x departures occur under both processes (before the next arrival), resulting in C0
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leaving under G˜ (if it is still present), but residing at the head of the queue under G, at time
Sx+1.
For L ≤ x < B,
Fβ = {Sx−L+1 < A1 < Sx−L+2;Sx+1 < A2;Uφ1 > p;U1 ∈ (q, q̂];
U ′m ≤ µ(X(Sm))/µ : m=1, . . . , x+ 1,m 6= x− L+ 2;
U ′m ∈
(
µ(X(Sm))/µ, µ(X˜(Sm))/µ
]
: m=x− L+ 2}
which, in the order presented below, under coupling C, results in the following:
• the queue size under each of G and G˜ moves from x + 1 down to L; C0 ends up in position
L in both cases;
• a controlled customer enters QS under G˜, but not under G; the resulting queue sizes are L
and L+ 1 under G and G˜ respectively; C0 remains at position L in both cases;
• a departure occurs under G˜, but not under G: this results in the queue size being equal to L
in both cases, C0 remaining at position L under G, and C0 moving to position L− 1 (or even
exiting the system if L = 1) under G˜;
• a further L− 1 departures occur under both G and G˜ before the second arrival, resulting in
C0 leaving under G˜ (if still present), but residing at the head of the queue under G, at time
Sx+1.
Define
Fζ = 1{x < L}Fα + 1{x ≥ L}Fβ.
By conditioning on Fζ , it is easy to establish that E[v0] > E[v˜0] and (ii) follows.
Note
For clarity of exposition, µ(xm) and µ(x˜m) have been written more explicitly as µ(X(Sm))
and µ(X˜(Sm)) in order to avoid confusion with x that appears in the indexing of the random
variables.
Next we show that the expected sojourn time of a customer in QS, when other controlled
customers adhere to the decision rule [g], for particular entry states x, is a continuous function
of g. This result is established under the proviso that a certain, albeit not very restrictive,
condition holds, which is presented below.
Stability Condition (SC):
Under ’system’ G, there exists a bound Dx such that
E
[ ∞∑
k=1
1{Ak ≤ v0}
]
≤Dx
uniformly in g ∈ [0, B].
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This condition says that the expected number of arrival instants that occur during the so-
journ of C0 in QS when controlled customers adopt the threshold decision-rule [g], is bounded
above by Dx, over all g ∈ [0, B]. This condition will certainly be satisfied in the case where
the inter-arrival times, which are given by the {Mi}, are exponential. To see this, consider a
’system’ similar to G except that the service rate is always µ(1). Flag quantities which are
associated with this ’system’ by ′∗′. Under a coupling similar to C between this ’system’ and
G, it can be shown that v0 ≤ v∗0 for all g ∈ [0, B]. But is also clear that v∗0 only depends on the
{Nj} and the {U ′l}, and, therefore, is independent of the arrival instants {Ak}.
Hence
E [
∑∞
k=1 1{Ak ≤ v0}] ≤ E [
∑∞
k=1 1{Ak ≤ v∗0}]
=
∫∞
0
E [
∑∞
k=1 1 {Ak ≤ t}]fv∗0 (t)dt = λ
∫∞
t=0
tfv∗0 (t)dt = λE[v
∗
0].
However E[v∗0] is just the expected value of the sum of x+1 i.i.d. exponential random variables,
each with mean µ(1)−1. Thus
E [
∑∞
k=1 1{Ak ≤ v0}] ≤ λ (x+1)µ(1) .
Lemma 6 Suppose that the stability condition (SC) holds.
Then for every k∈N, x∈{0, 1, . . . , B−1}, Vk(x, [g]∞) is continuous in g ∈ [0, B].
Proof
Consider customer C0 for concreteness, and without loss of generality. Consider (G, G˜) under
coupling C, with the additional restriction that g = L+q and g˜ = L+q˜ such that 0 ≤ q < q˜ ≤ 1.
Define
k0 = inf{k ∈ Z+ :Ak < v0, X(Ak) = L,Uk ∈ (q, q˜], Uφk > p}
where inf∅ :=∞. Indeed if k0 =∞, then v0 = v˜0.
For k0 = k<∞, then v˜0 > Ak, and
E[v˜0 − v0|k0 = k]
= E[v˜0 − Ak|k0 = k]− E[v0 − Ak|k0 = k]
≤ (L+ 1)/µ(1).
This follows from the fact that the first term is bounded above by the expected time to serve
L + 1 customers at the slowest possible rate of µ(1), and that the second term is bounded
below by zero.
It is easy to deduce that {Ak < v0} is independent of {Uk ∈ (q, q˜]} (noting that the former
is equivalent to {Z(Ak) > 0}). Therefore
P(k0 = k) ≤ P(Ak < v0, Uk ∈ (q, q˜])
= P(Ak < v0)P(Uk ∈ (q, q˜]) = (q˜ − q)P(Ak < v0).
Hence
E[v˜0 − v0] ≤ (L+ 1)
µ(1)
∞∑
k=1
P(k0 = k)
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≤ (q˜ − q)(L+ 1)
µ(1)
∞∑
k=1
P(Ak < v0).
By the Monotone Convergence Theorem,
∑∞
k=1 P(Ak < v0) can be expressed as E[
∑∞
k=1 1{Ak<
v0}]. Further observe that q˜ − q = g˜ − g. Thus
E[v˜0 − v0] ≤ (g˜ − g)(L+ 1)
µ(1)
Dx
as required. 2
6 Structure and Existence of the Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we first explore the required structure of any candidate symmetric Nash
equilibrium policy (SNEP) within the T∞ class. We then go on to prove that there exists a
finite number of SNEPs within this class, and that at least one of these is characterized by a
non-randomized threshold.
Lemma 7 Suppose that pi∈T∞. Then
(a) any optimal decision rule of Ck against pi must be a threshold decision rule;
(b) the set of optimal decision rules of Ck against pi, i.e. Uk(pi), can be found in the following
way:
set L̂ := min{L ∈ Z+ : Vk(L, pi) ≥ θ};
(i) if Vk(L̂, pi) = θ then Uk(pi) = {[L̂, q] : 0≤q≤1};
(ii) otherwise, Uk(pi) = {[L̂, 0]}.
Proof Follows from the definition of an optimal decision rule and the monotonicity result of
Lemma 2. Since Vk(L, pi) ≥ (L+ 1)/µ −→∞ as L −→∞, then L̂ is well-defined. 2
In the following discussion, the best response map of an arbitrary controlled customer, C(k)
say, is constructed, against the background of other controlled customers adhering to the policy
[g]∞. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we construct this map for customer C0:
this is as if to say that C(k) corresponds to C0 in the overall arrival stream.
Next, we define the mapping l(·) (as introduced in [2] but with a slight modification) as
follows.
For g ∈ [0, B], let
l(g) = min{n ∈ N : n<B, V0(n, [g]∞) ≥ θ} (42)
with min∅ := B. Since V0(x, ·) ≥ (x+ 1)/µ −→∞ as x −→∞, then l(·) is well defined.
Further, let {g1, g2, . . . , gJ} be the points of discontinuity of l(g) for g ∈ [0, B], where
0 =: g0 ≤ g1 < g2 < . . . < gJ−1 < gJ ≤ gJ+1 := B.
Notice that g1 = 0 if there is a point of discontinuity at the origin, and gJ = B if there is one
at B whenever B is finite.
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Following a similar methodology to [2], we define the point-to-set mapping G∗(g) : [0, B] 7→
2[0,B] as
G∗(g) = {g′ ∈ [0, B] : [g′] is optimal for C0 against [g]∞}. (43)
Since [g]∞ is a member of T∞, then we can invoke Lemma 7 to deduce that G∗(·) is given by
G∗(g) =

{l(g) + q : 0 ≤ q ≤ 1} if V0(l(g), [g]∞) = θ, l(g) < B
l(g) if V0(l(g), [g]
∞) > θ, l(g) < B
B if l(g) = B
(44)
By the aforementioned properties of V0(·, [g]∞), and provided that (SC) holds, it can be
easily deduced that
l(g) = l(0), 0 ≤ g ≤ 1; (45)
l(g) = l(0) + j, g > 1, gj < g ≤ gj+1. (46)
Thus G∗(g) can be re-expressed as
G∗(g) =

l(0) if g < g1
[l(0) + j − 1, l(0) + j] if g = gj, j=1,. . ., J
[l(0), l(0) + 1] if g0 = g1 and g ≤ 1
l(0) + j if gj < g < gj+1, j=2,. . ., J
l(0) + 1 if g0 < g1 < g < g2, or g0 = g1 and 1 < g < g2
(47)
Observe that the graph ofG∗(·) is staircase arc-connected and non-decreasing whenever g0 < g1;
a similar structure will hold when g0 = g1, except that a rectangular region occurs with bottom
left and top right co-ordinates given by (0, l(0)) and (1, l(0) + 1), respectively.
Define the map H(g) := G∗(g) − g with the same domain as G∗(·): here G∗(g) − g is taken
to mean [min{G∗(g)} − g,max{G∗(g)} − g]. The graph of the map H(·) has a ’saw-tooth’-like
structure, except that in the case where g0 = g1, this is modified to include a rhombus on the
interval [0, 1] with corners (0, l(0)), (0, l(0) + 1), (1, l(0)− 1), and (1, l(0)).
We shall employ this construction in the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Suppose that (SC) holds. Then in the class of policies T∞,
(i) there exist a finite number of SNEPs;
(ii) at least one of the SNEPs is non-randomized.
Proof The thresholds associated with the SNEPs correspond to the ’zeros’ of the map H(·).
By Lemma 5 (i), and using the fact that l(0) ≥ 1, then min{H(g)} > 0 for all g ∈ [0, 1).
Thus, we restrict our discussion to g ∈ [1, B].
Suppose that B is finite. Since min{G∗(1)} ≥ 1 and max{G∗(B)} ≤ B, then min{H(1)} ≥
0 and max{H(B)} ≤ 0. Thus, by the structure of the graph of H(·), and the intermediate
value theorem, there must exist a g∗ ∈ [1, B] for which 0 ∈ H(g∗).
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Now suppose that B is non-finite. Notice that V0(x, [g]
∞) is bounded below by (x + 1)/µ,
which is independent of g, and that (x + 1)/µ −→ ∞ as x −→ ∞. Thus, there exists some
n ∈ Z+ for which V0(n, [g]∞)> θ for all g ≥ 0. This implies that l(g)≤ n for all g ≥ 0, and
so the number of (vertical) jump points of G∗(·) (and H(·)), which is given by J , must be
finite. Therefore, G∗(g) = l(gJ) + 1 <∞ for all g > gJ , which implies that H(g) < 0 for all g
sufficiently large. Together with the fact that min{H(1)} ≥ 0, the existence of a g∗∗ ∈ [1,∞)
such that 0 ∈ H(g∗∗) follows.
As remarked earlier, since the number of vertical jumps, J , is finite, then the number of
zeros of H(·) is bounded (for B finite and non-finite), and so finiteness of the number of SNEPs
follows. Part (i) is established.
Suppose, for contradiction, that there are no non-randomized SNEPs. Then, by part (i),
at least one randomized SNEP exists. Such a point must correspond to a jump point of H(·).
Indeed, an SNEP occurs at g = gm if and only if a zero occurs which is strictly interior to the
vertical part of the graph at gm, i.e. min{H(gm)} < 0 < max{H(gm)}. However, we know
that min{H(1)} ≥ 0. Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists at least one point,
g
′ ∈ [1, gm) on a diagonal section of the graph (which is taken to include corners), for which
0 ∈ H(g′). But any such point must correspond to a non-randomized threshold, providing the
required contradiction for part (ii). 2
7 Computation of the SNEPs
The computation of the SNEPs is considered in this section. It will be assumed that
condition (SC) holds throughout. As per usual, attention will be restricted to customer C0,
although the argument extends easily to any Ck, with only minor changes in the subscript
indexing. The procedures outlined require the calculation of V0(x, [g]
∞) for various x and g,
the details of which have been deferred to the Appendix.
7.1 Evaluating the jump points of G∗(·)
The lowest point of the graph of G∗(·) at the origin is given by l(0). Defining
J = {1, 2, . . . , B − l(0)}
then the number of jump points is given by
J=max{j∈J : V0(l(0)+j−1, [0]∞)≥θ, V0(l(0)+j−1, [B]∞)≤θ}
with max∅ := 0.
The jump points, {gj}, satisfy
V0(l(0)+j−1, [gj]∞) = θ
for j=1, . . . , J .
From the monotonicity and continuity of V0(·, [g]∞), the j-th equation will have a solution if
and only if V0(l(0)+j−1, [0]∞)≥θ and V0(l(0)+j−1, [B]∞)≤θ (and in the case where B=∞, we
might more precisely replace this latter condition by limB→∞ V0(l(0)+j−1, [B]∞)≤θ). These
observations provide the basis for a systematic procedure for evaluating the {gj}.
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7.2 Finding the SNEPs
If an SNEP exists at g∗ ∈ (gj, gj+1) for j = 0, 1, . . . , J , then the line of unit slope intersects
the graph of G∗(·) on the horizontal section interior to gj and gj+1. Indeed, the height of
that section is l(0) + j, and so we deduce that g∗ is an SNEP in this location if and only if
gj < l(0) + j < gj+1: indeed, g
∗ = l(0) + j.
On the other hand, g∗ = gj for some j = 1, 2, . . . , J , if and only if the line of unit slope
intersects the vertical section of the graph of G∗(·) at gj, i.e.
gj ∈ [l(0) + j − 1, l(0) + j]
So with knowledge of the {gj}, then, again, these observations provide the basis for a systematic
procedure for finding the SNEPs within the T∞ class.
8 Behaviour of a dynamic learning scheme
Consider a dynamic learning scheme in which each customer bases their joining decision on
data collected by a central entity prior to its arrival to the system. Here it is assumed that the
buffer size, B, is finite, and we consider a service rate function of the form
µ(x) = µ
{
1− a
(x+ b)c
}
, x = 1, . . . , B
where 0 < a ≤ 1, b > 0, and c > 0.
We insist upon the presence of uncontrolled arrivals, in the sense that p is strictly positive.
Under this scheme each controlled customer follows the decision rule
joinQSwith probability S²(θ − Vˆt(Xt)), (48)
where ² is a small positive parameter, S² is an increasing function, with S²(x) = 0 for x ≤ −²
and S²(x) = 1 for x ≥ ², and Vˆt(x) is the empirical average (sample mean) sojourn time of all
customers who have exited QS by time t, but who entered it when the queue length was x.
The capacity for this scheme to ’learn’ the Nash equilibria of the system under the stationary
game is investigated using simulation. The examples are chosen to explore, in relative terms,
three different regimes: (a) small state space, slowly varying service rate, (b) large state space,
service rate quickly approaching upper bound, (c) large state space, slowly varying service rate.
Simulation 1
In this example, the arrivals are simulated to form a Poisson process with rate λ = 9. The
buffer size, B, is set equal to 10, with the service rate function, µ(x), for x = 1, . . . , 10, being
specified by the parameter settings µ = 10, a = 0.7, b = 0.05, and c = 1. The parameter p,
controlling the entrance of uncontrolled arrivals into the system, is set equal to 0.25. Also,
the quality of service parameter, θ, is set equal to 0.85 and S²(·) chosen to correspond to the
Uniform cumulative distribution function on the interval (θ− ², θ+ ²). Under these parameter
settings, it can be deduced that
l(0) = 6, g1 = 1.8799
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with the number of jumps, J , of the graph of G∗(·), being equal to 1. There is a unique SNEP
in the class T∞ located at g∗ = 7. A simulation of this system is performed over a horizon
length of 5, 000 time units, with ² equal to 0.03. Figure 1 shows a plot of V̂t(x) against time for
entry states 6 and 7, along with horizontal lines at θ− ² and θ+ ². From a very early stage in
the simulation, V̂t(x) stays well below θ − ² for entry states x = 0, . . . , 5, and stays well above
θ + ² for states x = 8 and x = 9. For comparison, we remark that V0(6, [7]
∞) and V0(7, [7]∞)
are found to be 0.7959 and 0.9028, respectively. The entrance probabilities against the natural
logarithm of time, under the learning rule, for entry states 6 and 7 are depicted in Figure 2.
The results of this experiment appear to support the hypothesis that the system-wide statistics
converge to those corresponding to the stationary threshold at g∗ = 7.
Simulation 2
For this second example, the parameter settings are exactly the same as those in Simulation
1, except that the service rate function is specified by the parameters a = 0.9, b = 0.05, and
c = 3, and the size of the state space is somewhat larger with B = 25. The graph of G∗(·) has,
again, one jump, with
l(0) = 7, g1 = 1.0666
and so it is deduced that a single SNEP resides within the class T∞ at g∗ = 8.
Again, the simulation is performed over 5,000 time units: empirical averages for x = 0, . . . , 6
stay well below θ − ², and for x = 9, 10, . . . , 24 well above θ + ². Empirical averages for states
x = 7, x = 8, are depicted in Figure 3 and entrance probabilities in Figure 4. The values of
V0(7, [8]
∞) and V0(8, [8]∞) are 0.8049 and 0.9046, respectively.
Simulation 3
In this final example, λ = 9, with the service rate specified by the parameters µ = 10, a = 1,
b = 1, and c = 0.8, and with B set equal to 25. This time the parameters θ and ² are equal to
1.5 and 0.015, respectively.
The graph of G∗(·) displays one jump, with
l(0) = 12, g1 = 13.1683
and so it is deduced that a single SNEP resides within the class T∞ at g∗ = 12.
Again, the simulation is performed over 5,000 time units: it is observed that empirical
averages for x = 0, . . . , 10 stay well below θ − ², and for x = 13, . . . , 24 well above θ + ².
Empirical averages for states x = 11, and x = 12, are depicted in Figure 5 and entrance
probabilities in Figure 6. The values of V0(11, [12]
∞) and V0(12, [12]∞) are 1.3998 and 1.5116,
respectively.
21
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
Figure 1: [Simulation 1] Plot of empirical averages against time for entry states x = 6 (dash-dot line) and
x = 7 (solid line) with the bands θ ± ² (dashed lines).
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Figure 2: [Simulation 1] Plot of entrance probabilities for controlled customers against the log of time for
entry states x = 6 (dash-dot line) and x = 7 (solid line).
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Figure 3: [Simulation 2] Plot of empirical averages against time for entry states x = 7 (dash-dot line), and
x = 8 (solid line), with the bands θ ± ² (dashed lines).
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Figure 4: [Simulation 2] Plot of entrance probabilities for controlled customers against the log of time for
entry states x = 7 (dash-dot line) and x = 8 (solid line).
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Figure 5: [Simulation 3] Plot of empirical averages against time for entry states x = 11 (dash-dot line), and
x = 12 (solid line), with the bands θ ± ² (dashed lines).
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Figure 6: [Simulation 3] Plot of entrance probabilities for controlled customers against the log of time for
entry states x = 11 (dash-dot line) and x = 12 (solid line).
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9 Conclusions
In this paper, we established the existence of a certain symmetric Nash equilibrium policy
for customers joining a queue with load-increasing service rate, based on the observed queue
size on arrival to the system. We proved that at least one of the Nash equilibria is non-
randomized: this is a somewhat different phenomenon to that exhibited in [2], [4], and [5].
Constancy of the expected sojourn time in g on the region [0, 1], and strict monotonicity on
[1, B], was established as an essential stepping stone for the game theoretic results2.
Simulation experiments suggest that when a unique (non-randomized) SNEP of the station-
ary game exists, in the class T∞, then quantities such as the empirical averages and simulated
entrance probabilities, under the learning rule, show a close correspondence to expected sojourn
times and entrance probabilities under the SNEP in the associated stationary game. Conver-
gence and stability properties in the case of multiple Nash equilibria are not well understood
at this stage; however, simulation experiments appear to suggest that the SNEPs are viable
poles of attraction and provide a rough guide to the operating points of the system.
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Appendix: Evaluating V0(·, [g]∞)
A procedure for calculating the expected sojourn time of a customer entering QS under
the symmetric equilibrium policy [g]∞, with g = L + q, and with buffer size B, is presented
via a set of linear equations.
We shall further assume that the arrival process consists of the superposition of two inde-
pendent Poisson processes, which are: (a) the controlled arrival process, at rate λc, in which
customers are governed by the decision rule [g]; (b) the uncontrolled arrival process, at rate
λu, in which customers always join the system, provided the buffer size is not exceeded.
Set R(x, 0) := 0 and let R(x, y) be the expected remaining sojourn time of a customer who
has precisely y−1 customers ahead of it in the queue, when the queue length is x for 0 < y ≤ x.
Defining α := λ+ µ, then the {R(x, y)} satisfy the following set of linear equations.
R(x, y) =
1
α
[1 + µ(x)R(x− 1, y − 1) + (µ− µ(x))R(x, y) + λR(x+ 1, y)] (49)
where 0 < y ≤ x < L ≤ B;
R(L, y) =
1
α
[1 + µ(L)R(L− 1, y − 1) + {(µ− µ(L)) + λc(1− q)}R(L, y) + (λcq + λu)R(L+ 1, y)]
(50)
where 0 < y ≤ L < B;
R(x, y) =
1
α
[1 + µ(x)R(x− 1, y − 1) + {µ− µ(x) + λc}R(x, y) + λuR(x+ 1, y)] (51)
where 0 < y ≤ x, L+ 1 ≤ x < B;
R(B, y) =
1
α
[1 + µ(B)R(B − 1, y − 1) + λR(B, y)] (52)
where 0 < y ≤ B.
It is easily seen that V0(x, [g]
∞) = R(x+ 1, x+ 1).
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